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Abstract 
 
This study investigates the linkage between attitudes towards risk and adoption. We 
empirically examine the relative risk premium related to fertilizer-use among 404 farmers 
from Malawi and examine the relationship between risk aversion on fertilizer-use and the 
adoption of hybrid maize. Results show that Malawian farmers exhibit absolute Arrow-
Pratt risk aversion towards the use of fertilizer. The findings also reveal that risk aversion 
towards the use of fertilizer is strongly associated with low intensity of hybrid maize 
adoption and that other than the safety net programs, human and financial capital 
variables such as age, household size, land size and off-farm income can be helpful in 
explaining the non-adoption puzzle. While safety net programs such as the free input 
distribution increase the likelihood of adoption, they are associated with low adoption 
intensity for hybrid maize.  A key lesson is that when considering promoting a 
technology, it is important to assess the profit distribution associated with the use of 
complementary inputs and its implications for risk preference among technology users in 
order to avoid formulating misguiding policies.  
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1.0 Introduction 
 
There is a wide acceptance that technological change is crucial in achieving 
sustained agricultural productivity growth. Increased adoption of improved technologies 
remains the key to achieving food security in most parts of the world, and more so in the 
Sub-Saharan Africa region where agriculture is mainly characterized by low use of 
improved technology and low productivity. For the last two decades Malawi’s 
agricultural productivity growth remained lower (1.9 percent per year) than the rate of 
population growth (2.1 percent per year). This trend has had serious implications on 
achieving national and household food security. Low adoption of improved varieties 
coupled with low input use patters and persistent droughts are blamed for this trend  
(Government of Malawi, 2003).  
Food security in Malawi is mainly defined in relation to the availability of maize, 
the main staple in the country. It is for this reason that the Malawi’s agricultural policy 
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for the past 4 decades
2
, emphasized the production of hybrid maize, a capital intensive 
and high yielding technology as a substitute to the local maize varieties. The provision of 
micro-credit and free inputs in form of fertilizer and seed to farmers are some the 
strategies that the government of Malawi has been executing to promote the adoption of 
hybrid maize (Zeller, et al 1997). Both, credit provision and free input distribution are 
expected to promote the adoption of hybrid maize through the relaxation of the liquidity 
constraint. Despite such concerted efforts by the government, and more recently Non-
governmental Organizations (NGOs), adoption of hybrid maize remains low. By 2003, 
more than half of the total maize land was allocated to local varieties (GOM. 2004).  
A substantial amount of adoption literature has reported on the determinants of 
adoption and a good deal of it showing that poor people are risk-averse and that their 
production decisions are characterized by a high degree of uncertainty. Feder and Umali 
(1990) and  Cornejo et, al (2002) review factors that affect technology adoption, and they 
highlight risk preference as one of the key determinants of adoption of most agricultural 
innovations. Although the issue of risk has been mentioned in such literature, the link 
between risk-aversion and adoption has not been adequately addressed. One notable 
exception is an attempt by Koundouri et.al, (2006), who motivated by the empirical 
evidence that most farmers are risk-averse and the general notion that agricultural 
technological innovations are perceived to be more risky than traditional technologies, 
assess the role of risk preferences on the adoption of irrigation technologies among 265 
farms located in Crete, Greece. Nevertheless, their analysis, simply looks at the decision 
to adopt, and does not look at the extent of adoption. Analyzing the adoption decision 
separately from the intensity of adoption is important because factors that affect the 
decision to adopt may be different from those influencing the intensity of adoption.  
Following Smale et. al, (1995) farmers adoption of hybrid maize seed in Malawi is 
characterized by several choices, one being whether to adopt only seed, only fertilizer or 
both. Other choices are related to the extent of adoption (land allocated to the technology) 
and the intensity of adoption (level of technology per hectare). Fertilizer considerations 
are important when analyzing maize adoption in Malawi because hybrid maize has to be 
accompanied by fertilizer in order to realize maximum yields.  
Among the several models provided by micro economic theory relating to 
adoption are the safety first models. The models assume that farmers that are constrained 
by the prospect of failing to attain their subsistence needs choose crop allocations that 
diverge from those associated with profit maximization (Smale et. al (1995). A related 
model is the portfolio selection model which states that risk-averse farmers who 
maximize the expected utility of income as opposed to maximizing the expected profit, 
can increase overall mean returns or reduce overall variance of returns by choosing a 
combination of seed varieties. In the case of Malawian farmers, although adopting hybrid 
maize is plausible, in times of drought or water stress, the yields are much lower than 
those of the traditional varieties. In addition it is widely believed that in the absence of 
fertilizer, local maize performs much better than hybrid maize. Morris Michael (1998) 
notes that fertilizer considerations are particularly crucial when deciding to grow maize 
because, of all the inputs in agriculture, none has the ability to affect productivity as 
much as seed. Adoption of hybrid maize, therefore, has direct implications on the use of 
fertilizer.  
A study on risk preference and adoption has significant policy relevance. Risk 
considerations are important in the analysis of the agricultural sector as there exists a 
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number of possible cases where intelligent policy formulation should consider not only 
the marginal contribution of input use to the mean of output, but also the marginal 
reduction in the variance of output (Koundouri et al, 2006). Ignoring the impact of risk in 
an adoption study can provide misleading guidance to policy makers. This study is 
motivated by a hypothesis that other than access to credit, risk preferences related to 
variance of profit and attitude to downside-risk may be responsible for the low adoption 
of such technologies. Specifically, we hypothesize that that farmers that exercise risk-
aversion towards fertilizer-use are less likely to adopt hybrid maize. The general 
objective of this paper is, therefore, to assess the determinants of the adoption of hybrid 
maize among farmers that vary in their risk preferences towards the use of fertilizer.  
In order to estimate risk preferences, we use a theoretical framework that 
conceptualizes adoption as a decision process involving information acquisition by 
farmers who vary in their risk preferences and in their access to credit. We integrate the 
microeconomic foundations used to analyze production uncertainty at the farm level with 
the traditional technological adoption models. We adopt Antle’s (1987) moments based 
approach to evaluate individual risk preferences with regards to the use of fertilizer, and 
then later incorporated the risk-preference as one of the explanatory variables in the 
adoption model. The analysis on adoption is done using the Heckman procedure. In the 
first stage we estimate the probability of adoption using the logit model. The second stage 
on the extent of adoption is estimated using the Generalized Linear Model. 
The rest of the paper is arranged as follows: in section two we present a review of 
literature on adoption. In section three we present the underlying model of farmer’s 
behavior under risk
3
 and discuss implications of risk aversion for the adoption of hybrid 
maize variety. The data used for the estimation is from Malawi and described in section 
four. In the applied econometric analysis of section five, we derive farmer-specific risk 
attitudes characteristics (absolute Arrow-Pratt and down-side risk aversion coefficients 
and risk premium) and we analyze the impact of risk preference on the adoption of 
technology. The empirical estimation of both, risk preferences and impacts on adoption 
are discussed. Section six concludes with some policy implications. 
 
 
 
2.0 Literature on Adoption of improved maize technologies 
 
  
A number of adoption studies report that technology adoption is linked to farmer 
resource endowment in terms of human, physical and financial capital, risk preferences, 
location factors and the characteristics of the technology itself. Among the key 
endowment factors is the farm size. It is generally hypothesized that larger farmers tend 
to adopt new technologies faster than smaller farmers. Feder et.al (1985) point that 
considering the uncertainty and the fixed transaction and information cost associated with 
innovations, there may be a critical lower limit on farm size that prevents smaller farmers 
from adopting. As the costs increase, the critical size also increases. Innovations with 
large transactional costs are therefore less likely to be adopted by smaller farmers. Ferder 
et, al (1985) however point out that it is difficult to isolate the impact of farm size on 
technology adoption from others in the sense that farm size may for example be related to 
other factors such as credit access, wealth and risk preferences.  
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Literature on studies devoted to production decisions by peasants in the 
developing countries provide rich incites about the link between adoption and risk 
preference. Work on risk-aversion dates as far back as 1971 when Sandmo established 
that a risk-averse firm facing output risk will produce less output than a risk neutral firm.  
The general notion in this literature is that farmers tend to use fewer inputs than would 
have done if they maximized expected profit due to risk aversion. There is wide 
acceptance that farmers only partially adopt or do not adopt at all even when the new 
technologies provide higher returns to land and labor than the traditional technologies 
(Yesuf, 2003). Studies on risk-aversion, therefore, have played an important role in 
understanding how farmers make production decisions.  
de Janvry (2000), reports that households can reduce exposure to consumption 
risk through risk management (interventions which are ex-ante relative to income 
realizations) and through risk coping (ex-post relative to income), and there is hence a 
tradeoff between the two. Since risk management has an opportunity cost on expected 
income, improved access to risk coping instruments may allow households to take higher 
risks in production and achieve higher expected incomes (Binswanger and Rosenzweig, 
1993; Morduch, 1992). Access to risk coping instruments such as flexible credit, by the 
poor has been used as a way of raising expected incomes.  
Using IFPRI data from Malawi, Zeller et, al (1997) investigates factors that affect 
the extent of adoption of maize and tobacco. They observe that adoption of agricultural 
innovations is mainly influenced by human capital, labor availability, farm size and 
access to commodity markets. The study notes that, although yields for local maize were 
lower by 49 percent compared to hybrid maize, the local maize varieties were grown by 
half of the households. The main reason was that hybrid maize exhibited higher risks than 
local maize. The study points out that risk exposure and capacity to bear risk and credit 
constraints are key factors that influence adoption. The implications from this study are 
that households with lower risk bearing ability are likely to prefer local maize to hybrid 
maize. Nevertheless, the study does not further analyze how farmers that vary in their risk 
preferences towards fertilizer-use respond to the adoption of hybrid maize. The study  
notes that the variability of yield and profit (variance) influence farmer adoption 
behavior. Although variability considerations are important, they insufficient to explain 
farmer behavior unless complemented by the attitude towards downside risk as well. 
Smale and Heisley  (1994) assesses the factors affecting the adoption of hybrid maize and 
fertilizer. Although they mention the role of risk in adoption, they do not empirically 
measure risk preferences among farmers and therefore conclusions about risk and 
adoption tend to lack evidence. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.0 Theoretical and Empirical Framework 
 
3.1. Framework for risk preference 
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Risky returns occur in the context of crop production because either the yields or 
prices or both are uncertain (Dillon, 1977). Often, uncertainties arise from the influence 
of the uncontrolled variables whose levels are unknown. If the probability of distribution 
of a return relative to the uncontrolled variables can only be specified conditional on 
controlled variables, the choice and level of controlled variables will influence the 
distribution of the return. Therefore in such a case, the choice and levels of controlled 
inputs should allow for risk effects. An individual is said to be risk neutral if the utility of 
the expected value is equal to the expected utility. In such cases the individual is said to 
have a linear utility function. An individual is said to be risk averse if his or her NM 
utility function is strictly concave, thus if the utility of the expected value is greater than 
the expected utility. Similarly an individual is said to be a risk lover if his or her NM 
utility function is strictly convex (Takayama, 1993).  
Hybrid maize performs better when supplemented with the use of fertilizer and 
therefore to maximize returns, its adoption has to be accompanied by costly inorganic 
fertilizers and seed.  Malawi is highly dependent of rain-fed agriculture such that more 
than 80 percent of total maize production is rain-fed. However, for more than a decade 
now, Malawi has been experiencing persistent rainfall uncertainties. Although hybrid 
maize is superior in terms of yield, to local maize, in the event of dry spells, local maize 
produces higher yields than hybrid maize.  This also implies high risk for fertilizer-use on 
hybrid maize. Farmers that are risk-averse towards fertilizer may therefore choose not to 
adopt hybrid maize despite its potential yield.  In the analysis that follows, we try to take 
into account the risk-preference of each farmer associated with the use of fertilizer and 
find out how it affects adoption of hybrid maize.  
We consider a risk-averse farmer who produces a single crop with output q.  Let p 
denote the output price,  f(.) is the production function, f  is the fertilizer input , 0x  is the 
vector of other inputs  and r is the vector of input prices. 
Applying fertilizer to maize (f)
 
is considered to be an important input for 
production to occur. Assuming that inputs are chosen to maximize the expected utility of 
profit EU(pi). The total profit of a farm activity is: 
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The von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function U(pi) represents risk preferences of a 
farmer. The farmer’s utility maximization problem is: 
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Allowing for risk aversion and assuming the cost of private risk bearing to be R, then the 
farmer’s problem is to maximize the certainty equivalent of profit given as: 
EU(pi)= U[E(pi)-R],         [3] 
 
where, R is the risk premium which measures the maximum amount that the risk averse 
individual is willing  to pay to have the sure return rather than the expected return from 
the uncertain prospect (Takayama,1993). It is assumed that R>0, ie that the farmer prefers 
a risk-less world. The risk exposure also depends on inputs, 0, xf , thus  R( 0, xf ).  From 
equation (3), maximizing expected utility is equivalent to maximizing the certainty 
equivalent, 
 [ ]0,( xfE pi  – R( 0, xf ),        [4] 
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Assuming that the risk R is represented by a random variable ξ with distribution G(.), 
then the farmer maximization problem of expected utility of profit without considering 
any constraint can be written as: 
[ ] ∫ −−= )()´),,((()(( 00
00
εεpi dGxrfrxfpfUMaxUEMax f
fxfx
,    [5] 
 
where U(.) is the von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function. The first order condition 
associated with use of fertilizer f defines the marginal risk premium with respect to 
fertilizer. 
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The first order condition for fertilizer can be written as follows: 
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where U´ is a change in the utility of profit as a result of a change in profit 
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For a risk neutral farmer the ratio of the two prices in equation 7 is equal to the expected 
marginal product of fertilizer input, which is equal to the first term in the right hand –side 
of equation 7. The second term in the right hand-side of equation 7 measures deviations 
from the risk neutrality case and it is different from zero when a farmer is risk-averse. 
The term is proportional and has an opposite sign to the marginal risk premium with 
respect to fertilizer specified in equation 6.  
 
A farmer only adopts hybrid maize if the expected utility with adoption is greater than the 
expected utility without adoption. The expected utility under adoption is: 
[ ] [ ] )(),,(()( 0´0 εεpi GrexrfrxfpfUUE aaafaaa ∂−−−= ∫     [9] 
 
Where, re is the cost of extra inputs that accompany the use of hybrid seed since it has to 
be bought at a higher price. 
 
A non-adoption scenario can be presented as follows: 
[ ] [ ] )(),,(()( 0´0 εεpi GxrfrxfpfUUE nnnfnnn ∂−−= ∫      [10] 
 
 
A farmer adopts an improved variety only if the expected utility under adoption is greater 
than the expected utility under non-adoption, thus  
[ ] [ ])()( na UEUE ∏>∏          [11] 
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3.2 Econometric estimation of risk attitudes 
 
 
Antle (1987) proposes a moment based approach to estimate risk-attitude parameters of a 
population of producer. We assume that a farmer maximizes a function of moments of 
the profit distribution.  We firstly estimate the risk-premium of each farmer associated 
with the use of fertilizer which is later incorporated in the adoption models that are 
specified in the later stages.  Following this approach, the farmer’s program becomes: 
 Max [ ] [ ])(),....(),(()( 21 XXXfUE mµµµpi =        [12] 
where jµ , j=1,2……, m is the m
th
 moment of profit. 
The first order condition of the program is approximated by the following Taylor 
expansion, in matrix form. Following the Taylor expansion which is not specified here, 
one can derive the marginal contribution of input j to the expected profit as follows: 
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where )!/1(),!3/1(),!2/1( 3322 mmjjjjj ××−=×−= θαθαθ  and ju is the usual 
econometric error term. A nice feature of this model is that the parameters jjand 32 θθ are 
directly interpretable as Arrow-Pratt and down-side risk aversion coefficients 
respectively (Koundouri et, al. 2006).   
 
The Arrow-Pratt (AP) absolute risk aversion coefficient is defined by: 
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A positive AP coefficient means that the farmer is risk –averse. Down –side (DS) risk 
aversion is measured by 
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A positive DS coefficient means that the farmer is averse to down-side risk (Groom et al., 
2006). Usually the higher moments have less influence on the dependent variable, as such 
this analysis will concentrate of the first three moments (i.e mean, variance and 
skewness) The risk premium is computed by: 
62
32
jj DSAP
RP µµ −=  for each j,        [16] 
where 2µ  and 3µ  are , respectively a measure of the second- and third-order moments of 
the distribution. The risk premium derived from the process is used as an explanatory 
variable in the adoption model. 
 
The empirical estimation of the analysis of these moments can be conducted as follows: 
 ∏+= 11.11 ),.....( vxxf ji βpi  for the expected value of profit, 1µ    [17] 
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where ∏1v  is an error term distributed with mean zero, E( ∏1v )=0.  Let 1β
LS 
be the least 
square estimator of 1β  in (17) giving the least squares residual  
( )LSjiLS xxfv 1.111 ,..... βpi −=∏  .        [18] 
  
Consider the following model specification 
( ) ( ) ∏∏ += 22221 ,........ vxnxifv LS β ,         [19] 
for the expected value of the variance of profit ( 2µ ). 
The least square estimation of (19) gives
e
2β , a consistent estimator of 2β ( Antle, 1983). 
It follows that  ( )exnxif 22 ,........ β  is a consistent estimator of the variance of profit, 
)( 1∏vVar .  Using the same procedure you can estimate skewness ( 3µ ). 
Following Groom et al (2006) we estimate derivatives to each moment with respect to 
fertilizer cost. A 2 SLS equation
4
 of the estimated derivative of the expected profit is 
finally fitted on derivatives of higher moments for the seed cost. The parameters 
associated with the second and third moments, denoted by j2ϑ  and j3ϑ , respectively are 
used as proxies for the Arrow-Pratt (AP) and the down side (DS) risk aversion measures 
as stated above.  
 
3.3    Determinants of Adoption 
 
We analyze the impact of risk attitude and other relevant variables on the adoption of 
hybrid maize.  A relative risk premium, which is a measure of the proportion of profit 
that each farmer would be willing to pay in order to avoid the risk associated with using 
fertilizer, is computed using the empirical framework outlined in section 3.2. The 
computed relative risk premium is included as one of the explanatory variables in the 
adoption model.  We follow a two step Heckman procedure in estimating the 
determinants of adoption. In the first step we estimate the likelihood of adoption using 
the Logit model. The decision to adopt hybrid maize is assumed to be determined by a 
latent variable y* such that  
*yy =   if  0* >iy  
    =0     otherwise 
*
iy can be expressed  in the following functional form: 
ikiiiy µδββ ++Χ=
*
  
where X is a vector of farm household characteristics, which, it is hypothesized that they 
affect the adoption decision, δ is a variable associated with risk preference, iβ  is a vector 
of coefficients for variables associated with adoption, and kβ is the coefficient associated 
with the risk preference variable. 
 
In the second step we estimate determinants of the extent of adoption using the 
proportion of land allocated to hybrid maize as a measure of the extent of adoption only 
for those that reported growing hybrid maize. Heckman (1979) indicates that in such a 
case, there is a selection bias because information on part of the sample is missing. On 
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the other hand including all respondents and running a regression with land allocated to 
hybrid maize as a dependent variable will lead to biased estimates. To correct for this 
bias, Heckman recommends the estimation of the likelihood equation and the intensity 
equation separately. From the likelihood of participation equation, an Inverse Mills ratio 
(see Smits (2003), for a detailed procedure) is computed from the predicted probabilities. 
The inverse Mill ratio is later included as one of the explanatory variables in the intensity 
equation. Considering that the dependent variable in this stage is a ratio with a minimum 
of zero and maximum of one, OLS estimation would lead to biased estimates. The 
equation is therefore estimated using the Generalized Linear Model (GLM).  
 
 
4.0 Data and sampling 
 
Data is drawn from the Malawi Rural Financial Markets and Household Food 
Security Survey, 1995´, conducted by the International Food Policy Research Institute 
(IFPRI) and the Department of Rural Development (DRP) of the University of Malawi. 
The survey covered 404 households selected via stratified random sampling method, 
from the three regions and from 5 districts. The survey districts are Rumphi in the 
Northern region, Nkhotakota, Dowa and Dedza in the central region, and Mangochi in the 
southern region.  The survey data is categorized in seven modules, however only 3 
modules were of relevance to this study and they included, household demographics, crop 
and livestock and credit and savings modules. Descriptive statistics for variables included 
in this analysis disaggregated by the adoption status are presented in Table 1. Adopters 
are households that reported that they grew hybrid maize during the 1995 growing season 
when the survey was conducted. 
There are no marked differences in terms gender, age and education of household 
head between adopters and non-adopters. However, adopting households are significantly 
(at 5 percent level) larger (4.9) than non adopters (4.3). It is also observed that adopting 
households have significantly larger (P<0.05) land holdings (1.8hactares) than non 
adopters (1.5hectares). With regards to wealth, adopters are wealthier with significantly 
larger asset values (Mk 2762) than the non adopters (Mk 1006). In addition adopters have 
significantly higher levels of access to credit than non-adopting households. A larger 
proportion of non-adopters (86%) than adopters (50%) rely on agriculture as their 
primary occupation. Other major sources of livelihoods for adopters are self employment 
(10%) and wage employment (15%). 
 
5.0 Results and discussion 
 
5.1 Risk attitudes towards the use of fertilizer 
 
Table 2 shows risk attitude statistics towards the use of fertilizer as an input in the 
production of maize. The results are in compliance with the expectation of risk aversion 
behavior among smallholder farmers towards fertilizer-use.  First the constant is 
insignificant which implies fertilizer is efficiently used by the farmers and that farmers 
have a profit maximizing behavior. A negative and significant constant implies that 
farmers are underutilizing the input under consideration, while a positive coefficient 
signifies overuse of the input. By definition we should not observe a significant constant 
term in the model linking the derivatives of moments with respect to each input (Groom 
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et al. 2006).  The parameter associated with Arrow –Pratt ( 2θ ) is positive and significant 
which indicates that farmers are averse towards the use of larger quantities of fertilizer. A 
simultaneous adoption of hybrid maize and fertilizer is crucial for the productivity of 
hybrid maize. Risk aversion on fertilizer-use can have serious implications on the 
adoption of hybrid maize. The parameter associated with downside-risk aversion, ( 3θ ), 
which measures the cumulative probability of getting lower returns, has the expected sign 
and is significant which implies that farmers are also averse to down-side risk associated 
with the use of fertilizer.  
 
5.2.1 Determinants of the decision to adopt 
 
Table 3 presents first stage logit estimates of the determinants of likelihood of 
adoption. The model chi-square which measures the goodness of fit of the model is 
significant at 1 percent level, signifying a good fit. Other than location dummies 
(Mangochi, Nkotakota, Rumphi and Dedza), a number of variables included in the model 
are significant. The amount of off-farm income is positive and significant at p<0.01, 
implying that it increases the probability of adopting hybrid maize. The finding is in line 
with our expectation because off-farm income is crucial in the financing of the purchase 
of seasonal inputs that accompany the adoption of hybrid maize. Age happens to be one 
of the human capital characteristics that have been frequently associated with non-
adoption in most adoption studies. The coefficient for age of the household head is 
negative and significant (p<0.01) implying that older household heads are unlikely to 
grow hybrid maize. Among the several reasons that could explain this scenario is that 
older farmers have a tendency to stick to their old production techniques and that they are 
usually unwilling to accept change. In addition young people are associated with a higher 
risk taking behavior than the elderly.  
Total land holding size of a household is positive and significant at 1 percent. 
This implies that households with large holdings have a higher probability of adopting 
hybrid maize than those with smaller holdings. There are two possible explanations to 
this. First, households with larger portions of land have access to a wider range of 
financial services in both the formal and informal sectors and therefore more likely to 
have the financial capacity to purchase inputs required for the adoption of maize.   
Second, households with more land are also likely to be wealthier, with increased ability 
for self financing and hence may be more likely to purchase and manage hybrid varieties 
which require extra costly inputs like seed and fertilizer.  
 Results reveal that households with more adults, as measured by the adult 
equivalent household size, are more likely to adopt hybrid maize than household with 
smaller numbers of adults. Labour is an important input in the production of maize. 
Larger household sizes are also associated with a higher availability of labor, which is 
required for the production of maize. The free input distribution program, had a positive 
and significant (p<0.05), effect on the adoption of hybrid maize. Inputs distributed under 
this program include maize seed and fertilizer, both of which have a direct impact on 
adoption of hybrid maize. The relative risk premium has no impact on the decision to 
adopt hybrid maize.   
Land pressure, which is measured as the number of persons per hectare is 
negative and significant at 10 percent level. This indicates that households with more 
labour per hectare tend to have a lower likelihood of adopting hybrid maize.  Experience 
has shown that households with larger pressure indices are also likely to be poor 
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households hence less likely to have the earning power to be able to purchase costly 
innovations. In addition Tchale (2005) notes that increased pressure on agricultural land 
drives away excess labour to off-farm activities and the revenue generated from off-farm 
activities is seldomly used to finance the purchase of inputs.  However, the variable has a 
positive and significant effect on the extent of adoption, signifying that once farmers are 
able to adopt hybrid maize, households with high land pressure will intensify their extent 
of adoption of an improved variety in order to maximize productivity required to meet 
their food and cash requirements from the small size of land. In most adoption studies, 
high land pressure has been described as a prerequisite for agricultural intensification. 
 
 
5.2.2 Determinants of extent of adoption 
 
The extent of adoption is measured as a proportion of land that is allocated to 
hybrid maize out of total maize land. Results on the determinants of the extent of 
adoption are presented in table 4. First, the inverse Mills ratio is significant implying that 
there is selection bias in the model and thus its inclusion in the model was necessary. The 
farmer’s risk attitude towards fertilizer-use is measured by the variable ‘relative risk 
premium’. As indicated in table 4, the relative risk premium is negative and significant in 
this second stage of the model. Thus, while risk aversion towards fertilizer-use does not 
appear to affect the decision to adopt, it significantly reduces the extent of adoption of 
hybrid maize. This implies that farmers that are more risk-averse towards the use of 
fertilizer are more likely to allocate larger portions of their land to local maize 
technologies  that allow them to reduce the production risk related to fertilizer-use. The 
results comply with the expectation that farmers stick to the production of traditional 
varieties as a means of hedging against input related production risks.  
  The age of households head is significant and negative (p<0.05). Households 
headed by the elderly allocate smaller proportions of land to hybrid maize than those that 
are younger. At the time of the survey more than sixty percent of the heads of households 
were more than 40 years old. Individuals with ages greater than 40 years are usually 
associated with high risk aversion than those below the age of 40. While larger 
households are more likely to grow hybrid maize, results on extent of adoption show that 
they allocate much smaller proportions of land to hybrid maize than smaller households. 
This could be explained by the fact that once the decision to grow maize is made, based 
on the abundant labor available, the extent of adoption will depend on the ability of the 
household to finance the purchase of inputs required for the cultivation of maize. In most 
cases larger households are also poor households which may lack the financial capacity 
to purchase inputs. 
   While the free input distribution program leads to higher a likelihood of adoption 
in the first stage, GLM results on the extent of adoption indicate that free input recipients 
are associated with allocating of smaller portions of land to hybrid than those that did not 
receive free inputs. The main reason is that the free input distribution programs target the 
poorer households who are unlikely to extend hybrid cultivation beyond 0.25 hectares, 
the maximum size of land for which free inputs are provided. The variable capturing 
tobacco growing households is positive and significant (p<1%). Tobacco growing 
households are usually wealthier households with financial capacity to purchase inputs 
such as fertilizer and seed, both of which are crucial for adoption.  
 
 
 12 
6.0 Conclusions and Policy Implications 
 
This paper has investigated the relationship between risk aversion towards the use of 
fertilizer and adoption. Using the moments based approach we empirically examined the 
relative risk premium related to fertilizer-use among farmers. We have shown that 
Malawian farmers exhibit absolute Arrow-Pratt risk aversion towards the use of fertilizer. 
We find that risk aversion on fertilizer-use negatively affects the extent of adoption of 
hybrid maize. The study reveals that when considering promoting the adoption of hybrid 
maize, it is important to assess the profit distribution and its implications for risk 
preferences towards the use of   complementary inputs such as fertilizer. Failure to do so 
would lead to the formulation of wrong policies. Human and financial capital variables 
such as age, household size, size of land and off-farm income, have a significant impact 
on the adoption of hybrid maize. A notable finding is that while safety net programs such 
as the free input distribution increase the likelihood of adoption, they are associated with 
low levels of the extent of adoption. This emphasizes the lack of financial capacity to 
purchase inputs as a key constraint to adoption. Without necessarily underscoring 
budgetary implications, it is important for safety nets programs such as the Starter Pack 
Scheme and the Targeted Input program (TIP) that are being implemented in Malawi to 
have their packages revised upwards in order to increase the extent of adoption for hybrid 
maize.   
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Appendix 
 
 
 
Table 1:  Descriptive statistics of selected variables  
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Variable Adopters 
(n=161) 
non-adopters 
(n=243) 
Total 
(n=404) 
Female- headed (%) 71.4 67.5 70 
Age of household head(years)   45 47 46 
Years of schooling of household head 3.6 2.8 3.3 
Years of schooling of spouse  2.6 2.1 2.4 
Household size 4.9 4.3 4.7 
Number of adult males (15-64 years) 1.2 1.1 1.1 
Number of adult females(15-64 years) 1.4 1.3 1.3 
Land holding size(ha)  1.8 1.5 1.7 
Land pressure index 1.4 1.2 1.3 
Credit access (MK/year) 346 232 300 
Livestock ownership (%) 53 65 58 
Asset value (MK) 2762 1006 2036 
Occupation of household head    
Farming 50 86 65 
Household worker 3 4 3 
Wage laborer 15 3 10 
Trade 10 2 6 
Other self-employment 17 1 11 
Unemployed 1 2 1.2 
Other 4.1 1.5 3.0 
Source: Own calculation from IFPRI/RDD data 
 
 
 
Table 2: Risk aversion indicators 
 
Risk parameter COEFF T-Statistic 
Constant -0.006108 -0.271 
Q2 (associated with AP) 2.05526**      2.203 
Q3 (associated with DS) -1.419432*** -2.987 
Source: Own calculation from IFPRI/RDD data 
 **, *** represent significance at  5% and 1%, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3: Determinants of   decision to adopt- Logit estimates 
 Likelihood of adoption 
 Coefficient t-statistic 
Constant -1.0782 2.3128 
Off-fam income 0.0001* 3.1100 
 16 
Gender of head (1=male) -0.0823 0.0612 
Age of head -0.0180* 3.1570 
Total asset value 0.0000 0.3650 
Household size 0.2409** 5.7341 
Land holding 0.5416** 6.0679 
Education of head -0.0627 0.0333 
Education of spouse 0.0681 0.0481 
Free inputs 1.0352** 6.6299 
Tobacco household -0.2099 0.2155 
Distance Extension Office 0.0040 0.0096 
Access to credit 0.0004 2.2864 
Land pressure -0.1565* 3.4360 
Relative risk premium 3.7279 0.8364 
Mangochi 2.4414*** 28.003 
Nkhota 0.3999 0.6635 
Rumphi 0.3674 0.3552 
Dedza -1.3242*** 11.282 
No.obs 404  
Log likelihood -352.706  
Chi square 192.788**   
Source: Own calculation from IFPRI/RDD data 
 **, *** represent significance at  5% and 1%, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table4: GLM estimates of the Determinants of the Extent of Adoption 
 
 
Variables Coefficient 
Robust standard 
errors Z P value 
Constant 2.51849*** 0.63738 3.95000 0.00000 
Off-fam income 0.00001 0.00002 0.59000 0.55300 
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Gender of head (1=male) 0.09124 0.25764 0.35000 0.72300 
Age of head -0.01900** 0.00848 -2.24000 0.02500 
Total asset value 0.00006 0.00004 1.47000 0.14200 
Household size -0.14900* 0.07712 -1.93000 0.05300 
Land holding -0.01422 0.08559 -0.17000 0.86800 
Education of head 0.13709 0.25908 0.53000 0.59700 
Education of spouse -0.29153 0.26448 -1.10000 0.27000 
Free inputs -0.29823** 0.14191 -2.10000 0.03600 
Tobacco household 0.65716*** 0.24843 2.65000 0.00800 
Distance to Extension 
Office -0.02798 0.03130 -0.89000 0.37100 
Access to credit -0.00006 0.00007 -0.89000 0.37500 
Land pressure 0.22064** 0.10761 2.05000 0.04000 
Relative risk premium -0.56208** 0.18890 -2.98000 0.00300 
Mangochi 1.03084** 0.43157 2.39000 0.01700 
Nkhota 1.67449*** 0.58909 2.84000 0.00400 
Rumphi 
-
1.13497*** 0.33120 -3.43000 0.00100 
Dedza -0.28698 0.32779 -0.88000 0.38100 
Inverse Mills ratio -0.70968** 0.28429 -2.50000 0.01300 
No.obs 241    
Deviance 127.74    
Chi square 83.65    
-Log likelihood -78.188    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
